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1.  Introduction and French Prelude
The heated debates and severe conflicts between the atomists and the anti-atomists of the latter 
half of the nineteenth century are well known to the historian of science.1  Anti-atomism was 
advocated by  a number of notorious scientists such as Marcellin Berthelot (1827–1907), Ernst 
Mach (1838–1916), Wilhelm Ostwald (1853–1932), Franti!ek Wald (1861–1930), and Pierre 
Duhem (1861–1916), whereas the atomistic school included Julius Thomsen (1826–1909), Charles 
Marignac (1817–1894), Adolphe Wurtz (1817–1884), Auguste Laurent (1807–1853) and Charles 
Gerhardt (1816–1856) among others. The position of Dmitrii Ivanovich Mendeleev (1834–1907) 
towards these nineteenth century  debates on atomism will be studied in this paper. A first attempt 
will thus be offered to reconcile Mendeleev’s seemingly  contradictory  comments and ambiguous 
standpoints into one coherent view.
By way of introduction, this section proposes a brief summary of a paper from the French rare-
earth specialist, Georges Urbain (1872–1938), who wrote about the reception of the periodic table 
in France, and who provided a lucid (and at first  sight very  convincing) account of Mendeleev’s 
atomistic standpoints and the French response. Urbain noted that the ideas of Mendeleev had not 
always been generally  admitted in France, and he compelled himself to offer his audience the 
reasons for this intriguing fact. “Longtemps deux tendances ont divisé les chimistes français”, he 
said (Urbain 1934, 657). “Les uns étaient équivalentistes et récusaient la valeur de toute hypothèse 
1 There exists an extensive literature on the history of atomism and the nineteenth century atomic debates. Some of the 
more important studies include: Rocke (1984), Nye (1976 and 1981), Brock (1967), and Knight (1967).
moléculaire, les autres étaient atomistes, et affirmaient leur foi dans la réalité des atomes” (Ibid., 
658).2  Both the equivalentist and atomist school were personified in France by an illustrious 
scientist: “l’une, celle des atomes, par Wurtz; l’autre, celle des équivalents, par Berthelot, qui 
traitait l’atomisme de religion nouvelle” (Loc. cit.).
It is indeed a well known fact that whereas the atomic doctrine was generally accepted by the 
chemical community, a great majority  of French chemists remained reluctant to adopt the atomic 
theory  of John Dalton (1766–1844) in view of its hypothetical (if not metaphysical) character (see 
e.g. Bensaude-Vincent 1999). “Se refusant aux hypothèses, [les équivalentistes] ne voulaient 
entendre parler ni d’atomes, ni de poids atomiques,” said Urbain, “mais seulement de nombres 
proportionnels et d’équivalents, parce que ce sont  là des données pures de toute considération 
métaphysique” (Urbain 1934, 658). It is sufficient to recall the famous statement from Jean-
Baptise Dumas (1800–1884) who exclaimed in his Leçons sur la Philosophie Chimique that “si 
j’en étais le maître, j’effacerais le mot atome de la science” (Dumas 1878, 315).
These were the French conditions in which Mendeleev’s ideas first appeared in 1869. “Vous 
comprendrez, d’après cela,” Urbain exclaimed, “que si [les idées de Mendéléeff] furent 
chaleureusement accueillies par les uns, elles devaient l’être très peu par les autres” (Urbain 1934, 
658). Indeed, Urbain observed that “Wurtz et son école se hâtèrent d’incorporer le Système 
Périodique dans la doctrine atomique. Ils s’en firent les propagandistes zélés, et le défendirent 
contre les inévitables attaques dont ne manquèrent pas de le cribler leur adversaires” (Loc. cit.). 
While setting the scene for the nineteenth century debates between the atomists and the anti-
atomists, Urbain’s account moreover forms a useful background against which to analyse 
Mendeleev’s position with regard to this thorny issue. 
2. Mendeleev as an Atomist
The reason why the atomistic school of Wurtz adopted Mendeleev’s table was self-evident. After 
all, “Les poids atomiques, et non pas les équivalents, formaient le pivot de ces idées”, dixit Urbain 
(Loc. cit.). Indeed, Mendeleev never refrained from rejecting the utility  of the equivalent weights 
2 All emphasis in this text is the author’s, unless otherwise noted.
as confusing at  the least, and he frequently praised the atomic theory  to the skies when extolling 
the labours of nineteenth century atomists.
Dmitrii Ivanovich had probably turned into this convinced atomist after his attendance at the first 
International Chemical Congress of Karlsruhe in 1860. Not surprisingly, Mendeleev’s admiration 
for the pioneering work of such great atomists as Avogadro (1776–1856), Ampère (1775–1836), 
Gerhardt (1816–1856) and Cannizzaro (1826–1910) came up quite frequently in his scientific 
publications. He thus emphasized at the beginning of his paper announcing the discovery  of the 
periodic law in 1869 that “the procedure, according to which Gerhardt and Cannizzaro have 
determined the atomic weights of elements, is based upon such unshakeable and indubitable 
methods that, for the majority of substances […] there no longer exist any doubts about their 
atomic weights, as was the case several years earlier when the atomic weight was so often 
confused with the equivalent weight” (Mendeleev 1869, 25). Similar statements about the 
“indestructible solidity” of the atomic weight concept appeared in Mendeleev’s landmark paper of 
1871 as well (see Mendeleev 1871, 40). Finally, during his Faraday Lecture of 1889, Mendeleev 
indicated the following group of elements, in which the gradual increase of atomic weight was 
“seen at once and is perfectly clear”:
K = 39  Rb = 85 Cs = 133
Ca = 40 Sr = 87  Ba = 137
“Whereas with the equivalents then in use” –
K = 39  Rb = 85 Cs = 133
Ca = 20 Sr = 43.5 Ba = 68.5
“The […] change in atomic weight  […] completely disappear[ed]” (Mendeleev 1889, 637). His 
belief that only “real atomic weights […] could afford a basis for generalisation” (Loc. cit.) seems 
therefore to be in agreement with Urbain’s abovementioned account of Mendeleev’s siding with 
the atomistic school.
3. Mendeleev as an Anti-atomist
However, numerous anti-atomistic statements which heavily contradict our first, preliminary 
conclusion are scattered throughout the Mendeleev corpus. In his groundbreaking paper of 1871 
for instance, Dmitrii Ivanovich admitted that “the expression atomic weight implies the hypothesis 
of the atomic structure of matter” (Mendeleev 1871, 40). In order to “avoid the concept of atoms 
when speaking of elements”, Mendeleev therefore suggested to “replace the term atomic weight by 
elementary weight” (Ibid., 106).
In his recent book on Dmitrii Mendeleev and the Shadow of the Periodic Table, the renowned 
Mendeleev scholar, Michael Gordin, considered atomism to be the theory “Mendeleev was most 
loath to take literally” (Gordin 2004, 24). After a thorough analysis of Mendeleev’s views on the 
atomic theory, and in sharp contrast with Urbain’s account, Gordin concluded that Mendeleev 
must not necessarily have been thinking in terms of atomism when he constructed his periodic 
table (Loc. cit.). According to his opinion, “Mendeleev’s scepticism toward atomism sharply 
emphasizes the difference between the present day interpretation of the periodic system and 
Mendeleev’s view of 1869” (Ibid., 25). In the same way, Kaji (2003, 193) argued that “Mendeleev 
was always cautious about atomic theory.”
4. Atomistic Confusion
The question naturally arises then of how Mendeleev’s apparent scepticism towards atomism is to 
be reconciled with the paradoxical fact that his greatest discovery was after all entirely  based on 
the atomic weight values of the chemical elements. Whatever may be the truth, it should be clear 
at this point that Mendeleev’s viewpoints on atomism were far from clear-cut. As a philosopher of 
chemistry once noted, “there is clearly a tension between Mendeleev’s various remarks, even on 
successive pages of The Principles of Chemistry” (Hendry  2006, 333). Not surprisingly, 
Mendeleev’s ambiguous statements have often induced pronounced disagreements between 
various historians and philosophers of chemistry who tried to grapple with Mendeleev’s seemingly 
schizophrenic behaviour towards atomism.
One such recent dispute for instance arose a few years ago between Eric Scerri (2006) and Robin 
Hendry (2005, 2006). Scerri (2006, 311) claimed that “there [was] considerable evidence to show 
that Mendeleev was rather sceptical of atomistic explanations,” while Hendry (2006, 331) thought 
Scerri to be “mistaken to represent Mendeleev as an anti-atomist” – claiming in contrast that 
“Mendeleev inclined towards an atomist interpretation of the periodic law, and of other chemical 
phenomena.” While Scerri agreed with Kaji and Gordin (among others) that Mendeleev was 
“cautious” about atomism – if not “wary” and even “sceptical” – Hendry on the other hand 
thought Mendeleev was “overwhelmingly realist” about atoms – “willing to bet on the truth of 
atomism” (Ibid., 332).3
Perhaps, as a way out of this chaos, one could consider Mendeleev a practising atomist who relied 
on the atomic weight values when working in the lab or building periodic tables, but who turned to 
anti-atomistic ideas whenever he was theorizing about chemistry. This stance is more consistent 
with an instrumentalist, rather than a realist, position (vide infra), and seems to be strengthened by 
a well-known statement of Alexander Williamson (1824–1904), president of the London Chemical 
Society. In 1869 – the year when Mendeleev discovered his periodic law – Williamson (1869, 
330-331) presented a paper on the atomic theory, and shockingly noted the fact that “on the one 
hand, all chemists use the atomic theory, [but] that on the other hand, a considerable number of 
them view it with mistrust, some with positive dislike.”
It was Friedrich August Kekulé (1829–1896) who first resolved the apparent ambiguity about the 
way chemists (Mendeleev included) dealt with the concept of atoms. “I have no hesitation in 
saying that, from a philosophical point of view, I do not believe in the actual existence of atoms,” 
Kekulé (1867, 304) said, “taking the word in its literal significance of indivisible particles of 
matter […]. As a chemist, however, I regard the assumption of atoms, not only  as advisable, but as 
absolutely necessary in chemistry. I will even go further, and declare my belief that chemical 
atoms exist, provided the term be understood to denote those particles of matter which undergo no 
3 According to Hendry’s interpretation of Mendeleev’s various statements, Dmitrii Ivanovich was “willing to take the 
epistemic risk of a commitment to the truth of atomism” (Hendry 2006, 333). Hendry admitted that this speculative 
interpretation was in need of “much more development and textual defense”, but wondered how an anti-atomist 
interpretation of Mendeleev’s statements could be squared with his more realist comments. This paper offers a first 
attempt to reconcile Mendeleev’s seemingly contradictory comments into one coherent view (vide infra).
further division in chemical metamorphoses. Should the progress of science lead to a theory  of the 
constitution of chemical atoms – it would make but little alteration in chemistry itself. The 
chemical atoms will always remain the chemical unit; and for the specially  chemical 
considerations we may always start from the constitution of atoms, and avail ourselves of the 
simplified expression thus obtained, that is to say, of the atomic hypothesis” (Loc. cit.).
5. Chemical versus Physical Atomism
Kekulé alluded to the crucial distinction between chemical and physical atomism – a distinction 
first proposed by the historian Allan Rocke (1984) when dealing with 19th century  atomism. A 
concise summary of Rocke’s main points will help to clarify Mendeleev’s ambiguous position.
The stoichiometric laws of Lavoisier (1743–1794), Proust (1754–1826) and Dalton governed the 
relationships between the equivalent weights of substances undergoing chemical reactions. 
According to Rocke’s opinion, these equivalent weights had three important characteristics: 1. they 
were empirical, 2. dependent on the compound analyzed (typically  exhibiting a number of 
different values for one particular element), and 3. related to the atomic weight, i.e. AW(X) = EW
(X) x V(X) (Ibid., 11).
The chemical atomic theory, first proposed by John Dalton during the early decades of the 
nineteenth century, suggested an explanation for these stoichiometric regularities. From a purely 
instrumentalist point of view, Dalton’s atomic theory provided a conceptual basis for assigning 
unique, relative atomic weight values to the chemical elements. Dalton moreover claimed that 
these chemically indivisible units entered into combination with each other in small integral 
multiples in accordance with the laws of stoichiometry.
Lest any reader find himself identifying atomic weights with chemical equivalents, let me hasten 
to emphasize Rocke’s list of characteristics distinguishing atomic weights from chemical 
equivalents: 1. atomic weights are theoretical (rather than operational), 2. presumed to be 
invariant, and 3. dependent on the assumed formulae for the simple oxides of the elements. Once 
chosen, atomic weights could of course be used to deduce the formulae of any other chemical 
substance (Ibid., 12).
Even though Dalton and some other chemists assumed the atomic theory to refer to the ultimate 
physical atoms (i.e. physical atomism), most chemists advocated a less materialistic interpretation. 
They  accepted Dalton’s atomic theory epistemologically, rather than ontologically. Rocke termed 
this chemical atomism – a pragmatic chemical doctrine that avoided all reference to the true 
indivisible primary particles of matter.
6. Mendeleev as a Chemical Atomist and Physical Anti-atomist
Having established the difference between chemical and physical atomism, it will be (temporarily) 
claimed in the following paragraphs that Mendeleev acted as a chemical atomist on the one hand, 
and a physical anti-atomist on the other.4 Some evidence for both assertions can be found on a 
more detailed examination of Mendeleev’s papers and textbooks. For instance, Dmitrii Ivanovich 
repeatedly emphasized (cf. Mendeleev’s renowned article in Liebig’s Annalen and his 1889 
Faraday Lecture) that he considered the atom as “the smallest portion of an element which enters 
into a molecule of its compound” (Mendeleev 1871, 40; Mendeleev 1889, 637).5 This quotation 
from Mendeleev’s hand sheds some light on his interpretation of the word atom. It  seems that 
Mendeleev considered the atom as a chemically indivisible unit that entered into combination with 
similar units of other elements (i.e. chemical atomism), while refraining from any consideration 
about the physical reality of atoms (i.e. physical atomism).
Indeed, in a footnote of the sixth edition of his Osnovy Khimii (his celebrated Principles of 
Chemistry), Mendeleev (1897, 216) compared the atomic doctrines of the ancient philosophers 
4 This viewpoint is in accordance with Gordin’s opinion who stated that “in his practical work Mendeleev, of course, 
used the notion that substances combine in defined ratios with each other (“chemical atomism”) – it was practically 
impossible to be a chemist without doing so – but he had long maintained a conflicted attitude to the physical 
interpretation of atomic theory” (Gordin 2004, 24). In the same way, Hendry (2006, 330) argued that “in 
understanding the complex story of atomism in the nineteenth century, it helps to distinguish chemical atomism (atoms 
are the smallest units of the elements), and various versions of physical atomism.”[emphasis in original] Surprisingly 
then, Hendry did not pursue this crucial line of thought any further in his defense against Scerri’s abovementioned 
objections.
5 A similar definition emerged as early as 1861 in his textbook on Organic Chemistry where he defined the atomic 
weight as “the minimum quantity of an element in the compound molecules of the element” (quoted in Kaji 2003, 
193).
with the present atomic theory of Dalton – noting that they were “essentially different” (though 
historically connected). While the Greek atomists considered the atom as being geometrically and 
mechanically indivisible (a “metaphysical principle” by the way which had never been “ratified by 
fact”), Mendeleev considered Dalton’s atoms as being “indivisible, not in the geometrical abstract 
sense, but only in a physical and chemical sense” (Loc. cit.). Therefore, the atoms of nineteenth 
century science formed the “units with which [chemists were] concerned in the investigation of the 
natural phenomena of matter” (Loc. cit.).
One understands now that when Mendeleev was praising the work of Cannizzaro and Gerhardt, he 
actually referred to their pioneering work in the field of chemical atomism (i.e. atomic weight 
determinations), rather than physical atomism. As a convinced chemical atomist, Mendeleev was 
moreover enabled to rely on the atomic weight values of the elements when building his periodic 
table – without therefore making any  reference or claim about the actual existence of physical 
atoms.
All this should not be very  surprising. Alan Rocke (1984, xiii) has argued that “virtually all 
chemists after Dalton were chemical atomists.” Indeed, chemical atomism was “universally  (if 
implicitly  and often unknowingly) accepted throughout the course of the nineteenth 
century” (Ibid., 10). The Karlsruhe conference of 1860 significantly aided chemists in achieving 
this uniform consensus with regard to chemical atomism, and Rocke therefore boldly referred to 
the periodic law “as more a result than a cause of that consensus” (Ibid., xii).
However, “the chemical theory was as successful and as uncontroversial as the physical theory 
was reviled and often rejected,” dixit Rocke (Loc. cit.). Physical atomism was far from universally 
accepted and many chemists considered it a rather controversial theory about the ultimate physical 
nature of chemical substances. Mendeleev shared this opinion and kept arguing that the atom 
should be treated as a convention, rather than to be taken realistically (e.g. Mendeleev 1871, 40). 
He thus argued that “the atomism of our day must first of all be regarded merely as a convenient 
method for the investigation of ponderable matter” (Mendeleev 1897, 217). This instrumentalist 
attitude towards atomism plainly  follows from his saying that “as a geometrician in reasoning 
about curves represents them as formed of a succession of right lines, because such a method 
enables him to analyse the subject under investigation, so the scientific man applies the atomic 
theory  as a method of analysing the phenomena of nature” (Loc. cit.). According to Mendeleev’s 
opinion, Dalton’s atomic theory was therefore “exclusively applied to explaining the phenomena 
of the external world” (Loc. cit.).
Whereas physical atomism could be used as a model of representation, this was certainly not 
compulsory  for Mendeleev. He thus exclaimed that “there [was] a simplicity  of representation in 
atoms, but […] no absolute necessity to have recourse to them” (Ibid., 221). Mendeleev warned 
his students not to “apply  reality to imagination” and he disliked the “atomists of extreme views” 
who still believed in the geometrical indivisibility of the atom (Ibid., 217).
The Atom as a Chemical Individual
In order to keep his distance from the “metaphysical reasonings of the ancients” and in an attempt 
to remain with both feet on the sure foundations of chemical atomism, Mendeleev considered it 
“better to call the atoms indivisible individuals” (Ibid., 216–217). He thus stated that “all masses 
are nothing but aggregations, or additions, of chemical atoms [!] which would best be described as 
chemical individuals” (Mendeleev 1889, 640). He admitted that  “the Greek atom” and “the Latin 
individual” were equal “according to the etymology and original sense of the words,” but noted 
that they  had acquired a “different meaning” in the course of time (Mendeleev 1897, 216). 
Mendeleev explained that  an individual was “mechanically  and geometrically divisible, and only 
indivisible in a special sense” (Loc. cit.). For instance, “the earth, the sun, a man or a fly are 
individuals, although geometrically  divisible” (Loc. cit.). Just as a man represented the “indivisible 
unit” in sociology, and as the planets served as units in astronomy, so the atom formed the unit of 
chemical experimentation. This shift in terminology from “atom” to “individual” clearly 
emphasizes Mendeleev’s desire to remain agnostic about physical atomism. Indeed, Dmitrii 
Ivanovich espoused the term chemical individual “in order to avoid recourse to the atom” (quoted 
in Scerri 2006, 312). The fundamental importance Mendeleev attached to the conception of a 
chemical individual will be discussed further on.
7. Nineteenth Century Criticism about the Periodic Law
Recent studies by Nekoval-Chikhaoui (1994) and others have shown that the relationship  between 
atomism and the reception of the periodic law was not as clear-cut as Urbain had fooled us into 
believing (vide supra). It appears that both atomists and anti-atomists accepted the periodic system 
as a valid teaching aid or a useful paper tool for chemical research. “It appealed to the positivist 
respect for empirical facts [i.e. chemical atomism], while at the same time offering new 
opportunities for theoretical speculation [i.e. physical atomism]”, Brush remarked (1996, 614). 
Michael Gordin (2004, 24) explicitly noted that “the periodic law eventually served as one of the 
strongest arguments in […] favour [of] physical atomism.” Although Mendeleev never considered 
his elementary table as providing even the slightest indication for the existence and compound 
nature of physical atoms, many of his colleagues apparently did. Prout’s hypothesis for example – 
which stated that  all elements were aggregates of hydrogen or some other primary matter – gained 
new impetus after the appearance of Mendeleev’s periodic law. Even Lothar Meyer (1830–1895) 
and John Newlands (1837–1898) – two precursors of the periodic table and both ardent advocates 
of physical atomism – saw proof in the periodic table for the physical reality of atoms (see e.g. 
Spronsen 1969). According to Brush (1996, 616), Mendeleev’s periodic system was considered “a 
doorway to deeper knowledge of atomic structure.”
Not surprisingly, physical anti-atomists responded heavily and the periodic table had to endure 
many severe criticisms during the latter half of the nineteenth century. Since very few chemists 
clearly  distinguished between chemical and physical atomism, Rocke (1984, 10) noted that “every 
attack on physical atomism impugned, by  association, the scientific worth of chemical atomism.” 
As a result, those chemists who disapproved of physical atomism, felt forced to reject the periodic 
law in its entirety – not noting the possibility of retaining the periodic table in the light of chemical 
atomism alone. This point of view will be substantiated in the following paragraphs by looking at 
two critiques against the periodic law from the renowned anti-atomists Marcellin Berthelot and 
Wilhelm Ostwald.
Berthelot’s Criticism
Marcellin Berthelot was a French chemist and a well known personality in scientific circles for his 
anti-atomistic views on matters chemical and physical (see e.g. Nye 1981).6 Somewhat strangely, 
Berthelot’s piercing critique against the periodic law first  appeared in 1885 in his work Les 
Origines de l’Alchimie. In the last chapter on Alchemical Theories and Modern Theories, Berthelot 
(1885, 302) considered the periodic table as “une tentative hardie, touchant peut-être à la 
chimère”. The chemical groups in Mendeleev’s elementary  classification were only artificial 
constructs (“des assemblages artificiels”) based on vague numerical relationships of an 
approximate nature (e.g. atomic weight triads). “Ce sont donc là des à peu près”, he said, 
“[résultant] du jeu équivoque des combinaisons numériques.  […] Tout ceci touche à la 
fantaisie” (Ibid., 301–310). Indeed, chemists who took the approximate for real would soon divert 
to the arbitrary fantasies of their imagination, Berthelot proclaimed. The only certain criteria of 
modern science were the empirical results, rooted in the solid ground of chemical experience: 
“c’est la seule barrière qui nous garantisse contre le retour des rêveries mystiques 
d’autrefois” (Ibid., 297).
From a purely epistemological point of view, theoretical systems such as Mendeleev’s 
classification could of course be very  useful in science. “Ils servent à exciter et à soutenir 
l’imagination des chercheurs” said Berthelot (Ibid., 312). But they did not necessarily  reflect 
nature’s ontology. “Quelle que soit la séduction exercée par ces rêves,” wrote Berthelot, “il 
faudrait se garder d’y voir les lois fondamentales de notre science et la base de sa certitude, sous 
peine de retomber dans un enthousiasme mystique pareil à celui des alchimistes” (Loc. cit.).
Interestingly  enough, the approximate character of the elements’ numerical relationships was not 
the only reason why  Berthelot discarded the periodic table. “Au fond,” Berthelot concluded, “ceux 
qui invoquent les multiples de l’hydrogène et les séries périodiques rattachent tout à la conception 
de certains atomes, plus petits à la vérité que ceux des corps réputés simples” (Ibid., 313). It is 
6 In an influential paper,  Mary Jo Nye (1981) has identified the twofold roots of Berthelot’s anti-atomism. First of all, 
Berthelot spoke against the physical realistic interpretation of Dalton’s atomic theory, while acknowledging atomism 
as a useful system of conventions.  Secondly, Berthelot’s stubborn resistance to physical reductionism made him argue 
for the classification of chemistry among the traditions of natural history.
apparent that Berthelot referred to Prout’s hypothesis and Mendeleev’s table in one and the same 
breath as “des interprétations aussi hypothétiques […] que l’existence même des atomes 
absolus” (Ibid., 291). Once linked with physical atomism, both these a priori conceptions 
(“analogues à celles des Pythagoriciens”) were thus rejected as a logical consequence.
Ostwald’s Criticism
A second criticism came from Wilhelm Ostwald in the second decade after Mendeleev’s initial 
announcement of the periodic law. Ostwald was one of the leading critics of atomism during the 
early twentieth century, who boldly proclaimed in 1906 that  “atoms are only  hypothetical 
things” (Ostwald 1906, 41). It seems therefore plausible that Ostwald would have opposed the 
periodic law for that very same reason. His critique against the periodic law appeared in 1885, the 
same year as Berthelot’s publication of Les Origines de l’Alchimie, and ran along the same lines. 
In his Lehrbuch der allgemeinen Chemie Ostwald (1885, 115) initiated his critique with the 
statement that “the numerous and unexpected developments which the Periodic Law has given us 
as to the relations of the atoms, one to another, should not make us blind to certain difficulties 
which have arisen in its full application.”
“In reflecting upon the causes of the Periodic Law, the same metaphysical consequences press 
forward which have served as starting points for the hypothesis of Prout”, Ostwald continued 
(Ibid., 116–117) – thus linking Prout’s (physical atomistic) hypothesis with Mendeleev’s (chemical 
atomistic) classification. “If the properties of the elements prove to be functions of the atomic 
weights, […] the assumption of a primal matter, whose different states of condensation define the 
differences of the elements, can hardly  be set aside. These hypotheses are far reaching and far 
removed from sure foundation […]” (Ibid., 117). Once again, the periodic law was dismissed 
because of its supposed links with physical atomism. Ostwald (as Berthelot) did not note the 
possibility of retaining the periodic table in the light of chemical atomism.7
Mendeleev’s Response
Mendeleev was forced to react  if he was to save the periodic law from these severe critiques. 
During his Faraday Lecture of 1889, Dmitrii Ivanovich admitted that “the periodic law [had] 
opened for natural philosophy  a new and wide field for speculation” by contributing “to again 
revive an old but remarkably long lived hope – that of discovering, if not by experiment, at least, 
by a mental effort, the primary matter” (Mendeleev 1889, 642–643). But Mendeleev convincingly 
countered Berthelot’s criticism and he broke off all relations with Prout’s hypothesis. “The modern 
promoters [of the Pythagorean conception] are so bent upon its being confirmed by  the periodic 
law, that the illustrious Berthelot, in his work Les Origines de l’Alchimie […] has simply  mixed up 
the fundamental idea of the law of periodicity  with the ideas of Prout, the alchemists, and 
Democritus about primary matter”, Mendeleev began (Ibid., 644). “But the periodic law, based as 
it is on the solid and wholesome ground of experimental research, has been evolved independently 
of any conception as to the nature of the elements [i.e. physical atomism]; it does not  in the least 
originate in the idea of an unique matter; and it has no historical connection with that relic of the 
torments of classical thought, and therefore it affords no […] indication of the unity of matter or of 
the compound character of our elements […]” (Loc. cit.).
8. Mendeleev as a Physical Atomist
Although some of the ambiguity surrounding Mendeleev’s (anti)atomistic statements has been 
eliminated at this point (e.g. by showing that 1. Mendeleev relied on the atomic weight values of 
the elements when constructing his classification schemes as a chemical atomist, and that 2. 
7 It must be mentioned that Oswald (1885, 116) commuted his criticism by observing that “these objections are not 
raised to refute the Periodic Law.” “They are too few in number for that,” he said, “and they stand opposed to too 
many favouring circumstances. They serve only to show that the law in its present form is only the beginning of a 
most promising line of thought” (Loc.  cit.). After Winkler’s discovery of germanium in 1886, even Ostwald found it 
hard to remain sceptical about the periodic law, and he admitted that Mendeleev’s periodic system had now “stood the 
test both in the prediction of the properties of elements at the time undiscovered, and in the indication of errors in the 
atomic weights previously accepted” (quoted in Brush 1996, 614).
Dmitrii Ivanovich rejected Prout’s hypothesis and the complexity of the elements as a physical 
anti-atomist) this does not resolve the whole issue. It appears for instance that Mendeleev did not 
always reside with the physical anti-atomists; neither did he always act as a chemical atomist!8
It will be claimed in the following paragraphs that Mendeleev was prepared to adopt some form of 
physical atomism whenever the universality  of his periodic law was threatened by new discoveries. 
Two examples will be mentioned in order to substantiate this viewpoint. The first one is connected 
with the rare-earth crisis of 1869 and the seeming impossibility of characterizing the rare-earth 
metals by  their atomic weights (see also Thyssen and Binnemans 2010). The second one comes 
from Mendeleev’s Attempt towards a Chemical Conception of the Ether – an intriguing response 
by the father of the periodic law to the discoveries of radioactive elements early in 1902 (see e.g. 
Bensaude-Vincent 1982 and chapter 8 in Gordin 2004).
The Rare-Earth Crisis
In order to understand the first illustration of Mendeleev’s physical atomistic viewpoints, a 
thorough understanding of the dual sense of the epistemological concept of chemical elements and 
Mendeleev’s philosophical approach with regard to the characteristic properties of the elements 
will be necessary (see e.g. Paneth 1962a, 1962b, 1965; Bensaude-Vincent 1986; and Scerri 2000, 
2005, 2007). Summarizing Dmitrii Ivanovich’s perspective, one could state that Mendeleev clearly 
recognised this dual sense of the nature of chemical elements. He thus distinguished between the 
elements as simple substances and as basic substances. Simple substances could be characterised 
by the plethora of secondary properties (i.e. colour, taste, smell, etc.), and were therefore 
observable and isolable. Basic substances on the other hand were completely  unobservable to our 
senses. This did not imply however that they were devoid of properties. Mendeleev was of the 
8  Kaji (2003) recently emphasized that Mendeleev’s doctoral thesis On Compounds of Alcohol with Water of 1865 
arose from his interest in indefinite compounds, whose composition was difficult to explain in terms of chemical 
atomic theory since chemical atomism was based on compounds showing only definite proportions. Kaji (2003, 194) 
cites Mendeleev further as saying: “In fact,  while the atomic theory was strongly supported by the law of definite 
chemical compounds, it was also challenged by the so called indefinite compounds.” And as Gordin (2004, 25) further 
concluded: “In a 1864 lecture Mendeleev argued that since definite compounds pointed towards atomic theory and 
indefinite compounds (like solutions) pointed away from it, “one should not seek in chemistry the foundations for the 
creation of the atomic system.””
opinion that the more abstract, basic substances were characterized by the atomic weight, and he 
therefore used this property in accommodating all the chemical elements in his system. “In the 
proposed system the atomic weight of an element serves to determine its place”, Mendeleev (1869, 
26) explained. He concluded for that  reason that “the magnitude of the atomic weight determines 
the character of an element to the same extent that the molecular weight determines the properties 
and many of the reactions of a compound substance” (Ibid., 27).
An important consequence of taking the atomic weight as the characteristic property  of basic 
substances was the possibility of distinguishing between the (chemically and physically  very 
similar) congeners of a certain elementary group in the periodic table. The natural group of alkali 
metals, for example:
Li = 7 Na = 23 K = 39 Rb = 85.4 Cs = 133
consisted of five metals which shared a lot of similar properties – their metallic lustre, their low 
melting points and densities, their pronounced reactivity with respect to water, their rapidly 
oxidizing character (tarnishing the metallic surface in a dull and grey colour), etc. It thus seemed 
as if the atomic weight differences were the only possible way to differentiate between these 
analogous elements. “Similar elements [in chemical and physical properties] possess different 
atomic weights”, wrote Mendeleev (Ibid., 31).
But in the case of the rare-earth elements, such as the cerium group {Ce = 92, La = 94, Di = 95}, 
the difference in atomic weights was scarcely noticeable. As Mendeleev explained in the first 
edition of his Osnovy khimii: “In spite of the great similarity existing at present [between the 
chemical and physical properties of the congeners of the cerium group], there are no differences, 
or to speak precisely, there are no considerable differences in the values of atomic weights of 
[these] similar elements” (quoted in Trifonov 1970, 38). There are more examples of this kind. 
“Such are nickel and cobalt, whose atomic weights are very close to each other; rhodium, 
ruthenium and palladium on the one hand, iridium, osmium and platinum on the other are also 
elements which closely resemble one another, and which have very similar atomic weights. Iron 
and manganese have similar properties and their atomic weights are also very similar” (quoted in 
Trifonov 1966, 27).
This implied that, in the case of these elements, no differentiation between the congeners was 
possible anymore on the basis of their atomic weights. Worded somewhat differently, the rare-
earth elements seemed to undermine the hope of characterizing the elements as basic substances 
on the sole basis of their atomic weight values. As a result, the question naturally  presented itself 
as to how the differentiation between rare-earth elements should be pursued. According to 
Mendeleev, these elements were characterized by “internal differences of matter” (Trifonov 1970, 
38). The reason for the differences “is no longer the size and the weight of the atom,” he said, “but 
obviously some other internal differences in the matter, constituting the atoms of these similar 
elements” (Trifonov 1966, 28). This was comparable in some respects with isomeric substances, 
as well as with metameric compounds, which were defined by Mendeleev as having “the same 
weight of particle [i.e. molecular weight] but in which the distribution of parts or atoms inside the 
particle is undoubtedly not identical” (Loc. cit.). Clearly, during the period 1869–1870, Mendeleev 
was still giving his thoughts about the periodic system free rein. The rare-earth crisis had forced 
Mendeleev to accept the physical underpinnings of Dalton’s atomic hypothesis, and he even 
seemed prepared to postulate about the compound nature of these elementary atoms.
Mendeleev’s Attempt towards a Chemical Conception of the Ether
A second illustration of Mendeleev’s use of physical atomism comes from a much later period in 
1902 when Dmitrii Ivanovich wrote down his Attempt towards a Chemical Conception of the 
Ether. According to Mendeleev’s opinion, the “earnest investigator” had to seek “the reality of 
truth, and not the image of fantasy” (Mendeleev 1904, 7). Having said this, Mendeleev (Ibid., 6) 
likened the atoms to “the heavenly  bodies, the stars, sun, planets, satellites, comets, &c.” 
According to this physical atomistic point of view, “the building up of molecules from atoms, and 
of substances from molecules, [resembled] the building up of systems, such as the solar system, or 
that of twin stars or constellations, from these individual bodies” (Loc. cit.). It would be tempting 
to consider this a useful model for chemistry, but Mendeleev emphasized that  this was not “a 
simple play of words in modern chemistry, nor a mere analogy” (Loc. cit.). Chemistry being an 
“archi-real science”, this naïvely realistic picture of atoms and molecules was “a reality which 
[directed] the course of all chemical research, analysis, and synthesis” (Loc. cit.). The reason why 
Mendeleev adopted this form of physical atomism will be outlined in the final section.
9. The Chemical Individuality of the Elements
In an attempt to answer the question as to whether Mendeleev was an atomist or an anti-atomist, a 
distinction has first been drawn between the two faces of atomism (chemical vs. physical). But 
even this distinction has shown its limits. Although some of the ambiguity surrounding 
Mendeleev’s (anti)atomistic opinions has been removed by claiming that Dmitrii Ivanovich was a 
chemical atomist and physical anti-atomist, this characterisation of Mendeleev has not always 
been in accordance with his various statements on atomism (vide supra). It has been shown for 
instance that Mendeleev was forced to act as a physical atomist from time to time.
I do not consider it  therefore possible (or even useful) to pigeonhole Mendeleev as either an 
atomist or an anti-atomist. Mendeleev’s viewpoints clearly fluctuated over the course of time and 
he adopted both atomistic and anti-atomistic interpretations of his periodic law. From the 
vagueness of his statements and the inconstancy of his opinions, it seems to me that Mendeleev 
was not gravely concerned with the nineteenth century debates on atomism.
I would argue on the other hand that the all important constant throughout Mendeleev’s life was 
his unremitting belief in the individuality of the elements. Indeed, “the conception of the 
individuality of the parts of matter exhibited in chemical elements only is necessary and 
trustworthy”, Mendeleev (1897, 221) said. The “peculiar individualities” of the elements, “the 
infinite multiplicity  of [these] individuals,” and their submission to “the general harmony of 
Nature” were all central to Mendeleev’s conception of nature (Mendeleev 1889, 642–643). The 
fundamental principles of chemistry were therefore “the indestructibility of matter” and the 
“immutability of the atoms forming the elements” (Mendeleev 1904, 9). It would thus be better to 
characterise Mendeleev as an individualist (or a pluralist) about the chemical elements. As will be 
outlined in the last part of this paper, this philosophical point of view may  be the key towards an 
understanding of the reasons behind Mendeleev’s apparently schizophrenic position – oscillating 
between physical atomism and physical anti-atomism. It  also puts a different complexion on 
Mendeleev’s critical attitude towards Prout’s hypothesis and the phenomena of radioactivity.
Starting with Prout’s hypothesis, it seems to me that Mendeleev was not so much concerned about 
the physical atomistic character of this hypothesis, as he was about the possible reduction of the 
multiplicity of the elements to one primary  matter (proto hyle). “While we admit unity in many 
things, we none the less must also explain the individuality and the apparent diversity which we 
cannot fail to trace everywhere”, Mendeleev (1889, 645) said. The periodic table emphasized this 
elemental diversity and precluded any reduction towards one unique matter. Whereas the Greek 
philosophers had been compelled to adopt “the idea of unity in the formative material, because 
they  were not able to evolve the conception of any other possible unity in order to connect the 
multifarious relations of matter,” natural science had now discovered a “unity of plan throughout 
the universe” which obviated the necessity of adopting such metaphysical beliefs about the 
existence of a primordial matter (Loc. cit.). Dmitrii Ivanovich thus explained in his Faraday 
Lecture how “the conception of many elements” could be retained and understood by  submitting 
them “to the discipline of a general law” (Loc. cit.). Indeed, Mendeleev argued that the periodic 
law (as embodied in his periodic system) represented the “unity [undergirding] the immense 
diversity of [chemical] individualities” (Ibid., 644). One thus understands Mendeleev’s violent 
reaction towards “the illustrious Berthelot” who “mixed up the fundamental idea of the law of 
periodicity with the ideas of Prout, the alchemists, and Democritus about primary matter” which 
had to be classed “amongst mere utopias” (Ibid., 644-647).
The discovery of radioactivity  (and the apparent transmutation of the elements) at the turn of the 
twentieth century also undermined Mendeleev’s conception of a chemical element as an integral, 
immutable, chemical unit. In his Attempt towards a Chemical Conception of the Ether, Mendeleev 
(1904, 17) dismissed the idea of radioactively  disintegrating elements – claiming that all this “talk 
about the division of atoms” was “contrary to the scientific conception of the present day.” In 
order to get rid of all this “metaphysical” and “metachemical” mumbo-jumbo, Mendeleev (Loc. 
cit.) argued that “those phenomena in which a division of atoms is recognised would be better 
understood as a separation or emission of the generally recognised and all-permeating ether.” He 
therefore had to consider the weighty elements uranium and thorium as real, physical bodies being 
“endowed with the highest degree of that individualised attractive capacity” (Ibid., 45). 
Conceiving the ether as the lightest  of gases, Mendeleev explained that it would naturally 
accumulate about the heaviest atoms of uranium and thorium. The “emissive flow […] from the 
radio-active substance” (i.e. radioactive radiation) was then assumed to be emitted ether (Ibid., 
48).
Thus, whereas Mendeleev (Loc. cit.) had discarded Prout’s hypothesis from a physical anti-
atomistic point of view (claiming that “the periodic law […] evolved independently of any 
conception as to the nature of the elements”), he now espoused a form of physical atomism in 
trying to save the periodic table from the dangers of radioactivity.9  It thus appears that (while 
being predominantly physical anti-atomistic) Mendeleev was ready  to adopt any kind of atomism 
or anti-atomism whatsoever whenever the sacred individuality of the elements was threatened.
10. Conclusion
Due to his empiristic attitude, Mendeleev attempted to dissociate himself from the nineteenth 
century debates on atomism and the farfetched, hypothetical speculations about the compound 
nature of physically real atoms, by  holding fast to the phenomenologically apparent diversity of 
the elements. As a consequence, the key towards a coherent understanding of Mendeleev’s 
viewpoints is not so much about the distinction between atomism and anti-atomism (or even 
between the two faces of (anti)atomism – chemical versus physical), but rather Mendeleev’s 
conception of the elements as chemical individuals. While Mendeleev’s continuously  varying 
viewpoints – running back and forth between atomism and anti-atomism – may appear rather 
whimsical at first sight, they all become rational and comprehensible when set against the 
background of his unremitting belief in the individuality  of the elements. Out of this positive 
conviction about the irreducible individuality of the elements, Mendeleev abhorred the idea of a 
primary matter (thus opposing Prout’s hypothesis, Thomson’s discovery  of the electron, and the 
radioactive decay  of the elements). The unity  of the universe was not to be sought in a modern 
proto hyle constituting the chemical elements, but in a unique periodic law of nature, underlying 
the “immense diversity  of elemental individualities”, and harmoniously  connecting the 
“multifarious relations of matter” (Mendeleev 1889, 644-645).
9 Mendeleev’s response towards the rare-earth crisis was very similar. Since the rare-earth elements could no longer be 
characterized on the basis of their atomic weight, these elements lost their individuality.  In order to safe the 
individuality of this group of elements, Mendeleev postulated about the internal structure of their atoms. Also,  when 
Bohuslav Brauner (1855–1935) – a close friend of Mendeleev and a renowned rare-earth specialist – proposed his 
asteroid hypothesis in 1902 according to which the rare-earth elements had to be clustered together in one case of the 
periodic system, Dmitrii Ivanovich remained sceptical because this accommodation methodology was once more 
undermining the chemical individuality of the elements (see Brauner 1902 and Thyssen and Binnemans 2010).
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